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REMARKS OF
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AT THE
SECOND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION
3 MAY 1955

The schedule set up for this morning makes it clear that what is expected of me is what Justice Holmes used to call "less an analysis of the obscure than an elucidation of the obvious." That is all I am going to attempt, justifying myself on the hope at least, if not the ground, that the obvious does not really become usable until it has repeatedly been made explicit. It is truly amazing to find out how often all of us ignore the opening instruction of the famous old recipe for rabbit stew. First, catch the rabbit. The comparable recipe for those engaged in security information about an enemy might very well begin: first, identify the enemy. That sounds easy. But have you ever got stuck trying to spell a word that you were sure you knew, until someone asked you to do it? Part of the trouble is, I think, that so many people have made their own special identifications of the enemy. We hear that the enemy is Communist ideology, aggressive Communism, Soviet power, godless Communism, traditional Russian or traditional Chinese expansionism or imperialism, sabotage, infiltration, espionage, conspiracy, an ancient evil in a new guise. We are told that the enemy is a nation, an empire, a group of nations, a bloc. There is no need to quarrel with any of those labels. Each contains some part of the truth and perhaps they add up to the correct total. Adding them up is an unwieldy approach, and it may obscure certain points which would otherwise be obvious. The first of these obvious points is that the enemy is human. He has tangible power, physical weapons. He has a working conspiracy. He has an effective ideology. He has efficient institutions and instruments of control. But power is neutral until it is employed by men. Conspiracies, ideologies, institutions, instruments of control have meaning only when they are given life and direction by men. Clearly very many men are involved but we can concentrate on a small group, the bosses, because concentration of power is of the essence of the Communist system so we can modify and expand the first obvious point and say that our enemies and the enemies of all men who are free or wish to be free are the Communist masters of the Soviet empire and those who do their bidding.

What are these people like? It is painfully apparent that I must generalize and it is equally apparent that my generalizations cannot possibly fit accurately all of these people. These people are not superhuman. They are not perfect. They don't always conform to their own ideals or to their own standards. After all, the essence of Krushchev's statement about agriculture

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was that a third of the collective farm leaders, who, you will remember, were all carefully picked men, had proved to be incompetent or stupid rascals. Some of our enemies are corruptible and fallible and subject to weakness. Others are incorruptible, able, and tough. But although the pattern has its exceptions, there is a pattern which helps us to describe the enemy.

The background of that pattern is what Communists for more than a century have called their guide to action, that is to say, their doctrine. Any mention of Communist doctrine ordinarily and quite properly evokes both challenges and skepticism. Do the bosses really believe the doctrines? Don't they just use the doctrine to support or to excuse actions which they have determined upon for other reasons? Aren't they completely cynical about these matters? When the Presidium meets, isn't it more concerned with tangible problems and real power than with the intangibles of doctrine? I think the answers to all those questions are "Yes." The Presidium probably does deal with immediacies and with tangibles of power. The Communist bosses are completely cynical about interpreting parts of the doctrine to fit particular situations. They use appropriate quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin to support positions which they have adopted for nondoctrinal reasons. But all the evidence we have over the past thirty odd years suggests most strongly that the bosses do believe their basic doctrine. There is no obvious paradox. Let me try to resolve it.

You may have noted that I emphasized the word "basic." What is basic in their doctrine? First is their faith that the doctrine is a formula which enables those who comprehend it to understand the past, the present, and the future. Along with that faith is the conviction that the Communist bosses alone have the power of sure comprehension. That is their only figleaf, their only justification and rationale for the monopolizing of power. From that first faith, the master Communists can and do argue that they are justified in telling others what to do because the others lack the requisite knowledge and understanding. When the bosses guess wrong, as they do, this same faith makes it possible for them to assign the blame to others. Their failures are charged not to the faith nor to the system but to the accidental or deliberate misapplication of the faith or the system.

What else is basic? Pravda, on 17 April 1955, quoted with relish and great approval Lenin's statement that, "Communists must know that the future belongs to them in any case." There is the second basic point -- faith in the ultimate triumph of Communism. It was because he violated that faith that Malenkov was set down so hard for saying that another war "means the ruin of world civilization." After that one slip Communist spokesmen, including Malenkov, have held to their standard theme, namely, that civilization would not be destroyed but that capitalism would.

Thus, faith in victory -- their victory -- is the second basic belief. Linked to this faith is a belief in the inexorable, omnipresent hostility between capitalism and communism. In their view this hostility takes many forms and it exists in many degrees of sharpness and violence. But it is always there. Strains, tensions, as they see it, are normal not abnormal, to be

expected, anticipated, provided for, used, not to be wondered at, nor wished away, nor ignored. Specific crises, specific tensions they hold can be settled by agreement, but the major, all-pervading crisis, they say, cannot. "The fate of the world," as Pravda once put it, "will ultimately be decided by the outcome of the inevitable struggle between the two centers."

The next basic point is that the Communists, knowing full well their own will to triumph over us, logically, assume that we want the same kind of triumph over them. Ladies and gentlemen, if you go about harboring hatred for your neighbor and filling your mind always with plottings to bring about his destruction, you will not long be able to escape a haunting fear that he has the same plans for you.

There are other basic parts to the doctrine, obviously. This listing is far from exhaustive. But we have touched on the major points relative to our special interest, except for one key item. How do these things that I have been talking about fit into a picture of the nature of the enemy? Does he consult the doctrine as an engineer might look at a table of stresses and strains? Does he look at it as a lawyer might search for precedent? In some cases he undoubtedly does, but the more important aspect is what may be called the unplanned use of the doctrine as a guide to action.

What are guides to action? That is not a very familiar phrase. It is, however, a familiar practice. In normal, everyday life we are guided by personal habits, by the customs of our group, by special circumstances and especially by assumptions which we continuously and usually unconsciously make. Assumptions are largely governed by what social psychologists are coming to speak of as perceptions. A perception, but in everyday language, is how you explain or interpret what you see or hear or otherwise sense. Let's say that the mercury in the thermometer stands at 70 degrees. We perceive that as being a comfortable temperature. We assume that the thermometer is accurate and we also assume on the basis of a lifetime of experience that we will be more comfortable under those conditions without a topcoat, so we leave our coats at home. That is a very simple example of perception, and assumption, and action flowing therefrom. Let me give you another and equally humdrum, ordinary example. We all of us assume again on the basis of experience that size and weight vary directly with each other. The bigger the package the more it weighs. Usually it does but who has not had the experience of lifting too hard on a package that proved lighter than it looked, or not hard enough on a package that proved to be heavier than it looked? The judgment we made of the weight was a perception -- a perception which rested on an assumption about the size-weight relationship. And that perception governed our action, which in that particular case was the effort originally applied to lifting the package.

Now let us see how Communist perceptions, governed largely by assumptions which rest on their basic guide to action, differ from ours. You and I, I think, could probably agree that the phrase, "a non-Communist government," was meant to describe a government not dominated by Communists. Could it ever be described any other way? Yes, indeed it could. The Communist perceives it differently. To him a non-Communist government is one "which under the guise of

of a struggle against the Communists is ready to establish a terrorist regime in the country, is ready to persecute any progressive leader who advocates his country's freedom and independence."

One more example will, I think, be enough to illustrate how basic Communist doctrine underlies perceptions, and, therefore, assumptions and actions. On our side, there is our perception of the awesome power of fission and fusion weapons, a perception which leads us to speak of the danger that a nuclear war will end in the destruction of world civilization. On the other side is the Communist perception as it was, for example, expressed two months ago in their top theoretical journal. Here it is: "There is another reason for the bourgeois ideology and propaganda about the destruction of world civilization. The imperialist bourgeoisie is a class coming to its end and, therefore, it has a peculiar tendency to identify its doom with the destiny of mankind in general." Ladies and gentlemen, these are not, as is sometimes alleged, merely different ways of using certain words. These are fundamental contradictions which spring straight from the basic guide to action. And that guide is the common denominator which distinguishes our enemy. Make no mistake about it. He is deadly serious about the guide and about his belief in it, and about the assumptions and perceptions which flow from it. He probably does not go around among his associates talking about mad dogs of imperialism, or power-hungry aggressors, or the wolves of Wall Street, but he is convinced that we and he are implacable foes between whom there can be temporary rest periods but no permanent coexistence except on terms of our surrender to him. If his guide to action were not enough, his own daily experiences in the dog-eat-dog, devil-take-the-hindmost atmosphere of plot and counterplot, violence and counterviolence, in which he lives, would convince him of the correctness of his "Whom-Who" concept. Who-Whom (sounds like a hoot owl) as you probably know, is an abbreviated way of asking the question, "Who will destroy whom?" This is to the Communist bosses the key question of human behavior. Do you suppose they apply it less to us than to each other? I don't!

Let us see what the picture we are developing looks like so far. We have identified the enemy as the masters of Communism, plus those who do the masters' bidding. We recognized many variations among them but we have also found that there is a pattern or common denominator, namely, the guide to action, and that guide largely determines perceptions and assumptions and, to a considerable degree, governs actions. We have seen also that the masters of Communism have to cling to their faith in the correctness of their guide and in the correctness of their interpretation. The alternative would be the admission of brutal cynicism and complete selfishness, characteristics which very few men will admit even to themselves.

Communists not only insist that their system is good, but that all other systems are evil. I ask you to think of that for a moment. Men don't justify their actions by appeals to evil but by appeals to good. The murderer pleads self-defense. Hitler didn't talk about the rape of Czechoslovakia. He talked of bringing the Sudeten Deutsch back to the Reich. The Communists we say — and say correctly — hold that the end justifies the means. They habitually lie, cheat, steal, kill without compulsion or without compassion, on the ground that their cause demands and justifies such action. Undoubtedly there are among them

some completely amoral or immoral men who care for nothing but personal gain. There are such persons in every society, and they are always viciously dangerous. These criminal types are not to be taken lightly, but they menace us less than the disciplined fanatics who are convinced that all their actions are righteous because the cause they serve is good. It is dangerous to discount that conviction. Some of you may have been very amused when Voroshilov in a speech last March said, "In fact, our peaceful policy, our struggle for peace throughout the world, is being supported by everything progressive, everything pure, everything honest that exists on earth." You may have said, "That is sheer nonsense. That is the sort of extravagant thing you expect from a demagogue." Well, you may be right, but don't forget that our enemy acts as if he believed it. Our enemy not only behaves like a fanatic; he is one. Cunning, calculating, disciplined, to be sure, but a fanatic. And that leads to my final point.

Some of you have been attracted to intelligence work by the challenges which such work offers to your ingenuity, your resourcefulness, your ability to match wits with an opponent. This is as it should be. There is an aspect of the work which resembles a game, in which one seeks to outwit, to outguess, to outplan, to outmaneuver an opponent. Take what pleasure you can from this, but keep it in its proper place. Ladies and gentlemen, this is not a game to be played under the rules of sportsmanship. This is for keeps. The enemy we face is dedicated to our destruction. He is neither omnipotent nor omniscient. He is not even seven feet tall, but he is tough, a competent professional all day, every day. Against such an enemy you can remain an amateur only at your own peril and that of our country. Prolonged existence is a necessity, even for coexistence.